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ABSTRACT 
The research aims to develop and apply the methodological approaches for the 
investigation of corruption-related decision-making processes to build a system of 
institutional arrangements at the macroeconomic level that eliminates preconditions 
for corruption emergence and ensures economic security. 
The vital importance of this investigation is caused by the substantial 
interconnection between institutions quality, corruption, and firms’ ability to achieve 
sustained economic performance. The manifestations of corruption have a negative 
impact on economic growth, investment, and market’s integrity. Moreover, it weakens 
the fair competition and disrupts the balance within the resource allocation system. 
This research results are allow defining interconnection between transparent 
corporate activity and the country’s economic security. 
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Within a framework of the national strategy for ensuring economic security, an important 
aspect is to consider potential risks and assess their impact on the country's economic growth 
and competitiveness. Corruption risks threaten the investment climate of the country and 
reduce the motivation of business entities to innovation activity. 
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The phenomenon of corruption in the existing literature is considered as a multifaceted 
and multidimensional object of investigation and is regarded as an economic, political, social 
and cultural problem in the majority of the countries. The 2019 Eurobarometer survey [1] 
indicated that 63% of companies through EU think that corruption is widespread in their own 
country, and 37% of them consider corruption as a problem encountered when doing 
business. Furthermore, sector analysis shows significant differences between sectors, the 
highest level of corruption in the healthcare and pharmaceuticals sector (71%), construction 
and building (63%). Worthy of mentioning, both citizens and businesses in 2019 consider 
corruption less widespread than in 2017 and 2013. 
Many practical and theoretical scientific groups at the universities and economic 
institutions have been conducting investigations in these areas leading to a vastly increasing 
number of publications in high impact international journals. For example, Fig. 1 shows the 
number of publications with keywords "corruption" per year in the World by the Scopus 
database of peer-reviewed literature. 
 
Figure 1 Number of publications on "corruption" keywords per year in the World in accordance to 
Scopus database of peer-reviewed literature (from 2000 to 2019) 
Despite the implemented wide range of international anti-corruption initiatives such as 
Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption, Anti-corruption experience-sharing 
program, The United Nations Convention against Corruption, Partnering Against Corruption 
Initiative, etc. corruption still touches both developed and developing countries, but with 
different intensity. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development [2] recognizes the 
corrosive effects of corruption on socio-economic development as well as on the 
implementation of 17 The Sustainable Development Goals. 
Corruption exists in all countries but with different intensity and damaging consequences, 
and more common in developing economies and emerging markets. We have determined 
variance between GDP per capita and Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) Score 2018 with 
using a grouping of countries by their level of income. Results of the analysis are presented in 
Fig. 2. Spearmen rank shows a high correlation (R) between GDP per capita, PPP and CPI 
Score in the sample for all countries as well as statistically significance of CPI at any 
conventional significance level. Multiple R vary among income groups countries: the stronger 
correlation is observed for high and lower-middle-income countries and less intense for low 
and upper-middle-income. CPI is statistically significant for high and lower-middle-income 
countries. 
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Figure 2 GDP per capita, (const. 2011 international $) and Corruption Perceptions Index Score, 2018 
Although the problem of corruption has occurred since 4th century BC [3], only a few 
countries reduced this manifestation to a minimum level. As results, the last decades have 
witnessed a tremendous increase in research activity on the corruption-related behavior 
among scientist from different fields as well as policy-makers‟ reform initiatives. 
There are many theoretical approaches developed to study the peculiarities of corruption. 
However, estimation of the complex interconnection between institutions quality, corruption 
and firm' ability to achieve the sustained economic performance faces a lack of theoretical and 
methodological knowledge and approaches. This is mainly because of the significant 
complexity of the problem. It is crucial to consider the peculiarities of corruption-related 
decision-making in the microeconomic model and to identify the factors which prevent 
individuals from having a negative effect on the company's performance. Estimation of the 
determinants of corruption can help to develop a system of institutional arrangements at the 
macroeconomic level to neutralize the negative manifestations of corruption. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1. Micro Evidence 
The impact of corruption on the company‟s business activity is not unambiguous and requires 
more detailed analysis. Existing scientific literature does not give an unequivocal answer to 
the negative or positive impact of corruption manifestations on business efficiency. Some 
scientists advocate for unequivocally negative or “sand the wheels” effect of corruption 
(increasing transaction and operating expenses, reduction in investment and innovation), 
others that corruption has “grease the wheels” effect and helps overcome bureaucratic 
constraints, inefficiencies in providing government services and accelerates management 
decisions. Authors generalized analysis of literature on the impact of corruption on 
companies‟ business activities. 
The negative impact: 
 reduction of companies‟ profitability as a result of increase operating expenses, the uncertainty 
of the internal and external environment, misallocation of production factors [4-7]; 
 distortion the efficient allocation of capital [8]; 
 increasing transaction costs for companies that operate in the international business 
environment and/or need to attract international investment [9,10]; 
 restraining incentives to the growth of the companies to remain small and less visible to the 
state control bodies, in particular for tax collection process  [11]; 
 delays in the provision of public services, increasing bureaucratic delays in project 
implementation as well as creates negative externalities [6]; 
 reallocation of talent individuals from production sector to rent-seeking [12,13]; 
 reduces sales growth, productivity and competitiveness of companies [14,15,16]; 
 increasing negative effect on the company‟ productivity in states with a weak institutional 
system; 
 possible support for inefficient enterprises, the withdrawal of human capital, technology and 
financial capital in an unproductive area [12,17]; 
 bringing some enterprises to bankruptcy in order to increase the profitability of others, which, 
in their turn, require higher bribes [18]. 
The incentive impact: 
 help to overcome bureaucratic constraints and inefficiencies in the provision of public services 
(especially in countries with a weak institutional system) [19-24]; 
 acceleration decision-making process, overcome administrative barriers [4]; 
 corruption can be useful to bypass the regulatory and administrative constraints; 
 Asian paradox (positive correlation between corruption and economic growth in Asian 
countries), including issues of the critical intermediate effect of institutes [25]; 
 enterprises are more likely to increase growth if they work in local conditions of bribery, 
where corruption provides more significant opportunities for growth [26]; 
 corruption is a stimulus for FDI [27]. 
Thus, a company can behave as a subject and object of corruption behavior, or in other 
words as a subject and object of an institutional trap [28]. Initially, the corruption-related 
decision-making of the firm (firm – “subject” of corruption) can help reduce its transaction 
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costs in contractual relations and accelerate the adoption of positive decisions, but ultimately, 
stimulates the spread and stability of the corruption system, and thus the deterioration of the 
institutional balance in the country (firm – “object” of corruption). 
Thus, this situation can be considered in terms of shot and long-run perspective. 
Corruption may help overcome cumbersome regulation and administrative restrictions in the 
short period, but makes incentives to generate more regulation in the long period and 
stimulates inefficient government interventions. This situation leads to an increasing number 
of corrupt government officials, causing the deficiency of governance and spreading overall 
“tolerance of corruption”. 
2.2. Macro Evidence 
The assessment of the impact of corruption on long-term economic development in the 
scientific community in the majority is unambiguous and negative. The phenomenon of 
corruption weakens democracy, distorts market mechanisms, threats to national security and 
impacts on the lives of people in economics, politics, social and cultural aspects [29]. 
The negative impact of corruption can be considered through the following channels:  
1. distortion of market signals and inappropriate allocation of resources;  
2. the presence of high rent, which negatively affects business innovation [4,5]; the presence of 
corrupt authorities that restrict investment in education, social security and infrastructure 
[5,30]; 
3. reducing the competitiveness of the economy. 
The negative phenomena and consequences of corruption in terms of of institutional 
quality of the country should be noted separately. Corruption weakens the credibility of key 
public institutions, such as courts and control authorities [9], in particular, through the erosion 
of confidence [31]. Most scholars conclude that in states with a weak institutional and legal 
system, corruption is considered to be a significant disincentive to social and economic 
development. Several authors concluded that corruption is a significant challenge for 
developing countries. Treisman D. in 2007 analyzed the results of research by scholars over 
the past 10 years and found empirical evidence that developed, long-established liberal 
democracies with freedom of speech and a significant share of women in government are less 
corrupt. Moreover, countries that depend on fuel exports and obsessive business rules, 
inflation unpredictability are considered to be more corrupt. However, the size and 
manifestation of corruption depend on the peculiarities of the country's historical 
development, its culture and the perception of uncertainty [32]. 
At present, only a few publications partly cover the subject of interconnection between 
institutions quality, corruption-related decision-making and firm‟s ability to achieve sustained 
economic performance. The critical issues here are to estimate interconnection between those 
three elements and in turn to develop the framework for the actions to neutralize the negative 
manifestations of corruption and prevent corruption at both the macro and micro levels. 
2.3. Measurement of Corruption 
Authors in [29] defined that quantifying corruption as a shadow element of economy is 
complicated and controversial for measurement. The most popular of indices are CPI index – 
corruption perception index (Transparency International); ICRG index – the corruption index 
(the International Country Risk Guide); The control of corruption index (WB index) from 
Worldwide Governance Indicators Dataset. 
Separately, should be mentioned surveys about corruption made by Transparency 
international from a different perspective and time dimensions: Global corruption barometer, 
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the bribe payers index (BPI), The Report on oil and gas companies, Transparency in corporate 
reporting, Defense companies anti-corruption index (CI), Government defense anti-corruption 
index (GI). 
2.4. Measurement of Institutional Quality 
The role and measurement of institutional quality is a complicated issue to measure due to the 
wide range of socio-economic, political and cultural dimensions. The measurement can vary 
on several factors such as the method of data collection, data coverage over time, 
transparency and replicability of measures, the incentive for accuracy and level of aggregating 
included indicators. In literature for measurement of institutional quality often use The 
Freedom House indexes of political freedoms and civil liberties, International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) indicators, Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI), or construction 
of aggregate indexes from numerous indicators. However, the most common approach to 
construct institutional quality is the usage of six World Bank Governance Indicators available 
from the World Bank website. Institutional quality from WBGI consists of the following key 
dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law and control of corruption [33].  
 
 
Figure 3 Indices of institutional quality, 2018* 
*Database: The Worldwide Governance Indicator. 
The number of observations: high income – 65; low income – 31; lower middle income – 47; upper 
middle income – 60. 
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It is worth mentioning that the ease of doing business index (World Bank Group) is 
acceptable for measuring institutional quality [34]. This Index measures the quality of the 
processes and administrative work.  
In our research, we aggregate institutional index as six specific institutional indices from 
WBGI (the average of „voice and accountability‟, „political stability‟, „government 
effectiveness‟, „regulatory quality‟, „rule of law‟, and „controlof corruption‟).  
We calculated the distribution of institutional indices for different counties depends on 
income level in Fig. 3. The boxplots show some visible differences across three groups of 
countries. For instance, high-income countries all institutional indices are above 0, that 
represent the strong institutional quality of countries. „Control for corruption‟ is the 
institutional dimension where most countries have low score distribution. Low-income 
countries have week all institutional indices: „political stability‟ are lowest. 
3. RESEARCH RESULTS 
For the purpose of research, we put forward the following hypotheses: 
H 0: β j = 0 (corruption does not affect firm activity); 
H 1: β j ≠ 0 (corruption affects firm activity). 
The following indicators were used to prove the hypotheses put forward: 
 „Control of corruption‟ (composite index indicator World Management (WGI) according to 
the World Bank). Index „Control of corruption‟ in the present idea of business and society to 
which state institutions are using power for personal gain, including various manifestations of 
corruption, political corruption (grand corruption) and the capture of the state by elites / 
private interests (state capture). Grade: 2.5 (weak second) to 2.5 (strong second) control of 
corruption. 
 „Ease of doing business – Global assessment‟ (DB17-19). The assessment is used to compare 
the ease of doing business between countries and is calculated by the World Bank. The overall 
assessment is based on taking into account the following indicators (ease of 
establishment/registration of a business and its closure, obtaining a building permit, 
connection to energy supply systems, registration of property, obtaining a loan, protecting the 
rights of minority investors, paying taxes, international trade, enforcing contracts, solving 
insolvency problems). The estimate 1 – most attractive business environment. This indicator is 
translated into logarithmic dimension. 
 
Figure 4 „Control of corruption‟ and „Ease of doing business – global assessment‟; 190 countries, 
2018 
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To compare these indicators, 2018 and 190 countries of the world were selected. 
Graphically, „Control of corruption‟ and „Ease of doing business – global assessment‟ is 
presented in Fig. 4. 
Analysis of Fig. 4 makes it possible to conclude that there is a positive link between the 
effectiveness of „Control of corruption‟ and „Ease of doing business‟ (see Table 1). 
Table 1 “Control of corruption” and “Ease of doing business” by OLS (Model log-level) 
 Coefficient Std Error t Stat p-values 
β 1.782 0.006 292.147 0.000 
Control of corruption 0.075 0.006 12.298 0.000 
Note: R – squared: 0.45; Adj. R-squared: 0.44; F-statistic: 151.26; ***p< 0.001; Number of 
observations: 190. 
The model is estimated using the least-squares method. Assessment is unbiased and 
statistically significant for all levels of significance. In this way, we reject the 
hypothesis H0 and statistically prove the hypothesis H1 of the existence of the influence of 
corruption on entrepreneurial activity. With other things being equal, increasing the „control 
of corruption‟ conventional unit 0.1 (score and used WGI) ease of doing business increased 
by 0.7%. 
We can define the essence of „national security‟ as the ability of a country to detect, 
prevent and neutralize real and potential threats to national interests in a timely manner. 
Economic security can be considered as an integral part of national safety. Dangers to the 
economic security of the country from corruption might be reflected in the following: loss of 
the public image of the state; international isolation from the world market; deterioration of 
political, economic, social and legal positions on the world stage; unwillingness to accept 
country into prestigious world organizations; criminalization and shadowing of the economy; 
devaluation of moral values [35]. 
Worth noting, the importance of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and 
digitalization as customer-oriented administrative service that could increase transparency, 
accountability and facilitate advocacy at all level of the economy [36].  At the state level, it is 
extremely significant to take into account measures to combat and control corruption in the 
implementation of the national economic security strategy, which should include the 
irrevocability of punishment and criminal responsibility for committing corruption offences, 
instilling in society a perception that corruption is an unacceptable lifestyle. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The national security strategy should contain a set of legislative and organizational measures 
aimed at permanent protection of interests of the society and the nation, which ensure 
sustainable development, prevention and neutralization of real and potential threats to the 
national interests and in the national interests and vital activities [37]. Such measures should 
be aimed at the fight against corruption, providing an enabling environment for health care, 
education and science, innovation policy, property rights protection, support of stock market 
and securities circulation, fiscal and customs policy, trade and business, banking services, 
investment policy, audit, monetary and monetary policy, information protection, licensing, 
industry and agriculture, transport and communications, language, information technology, 
energy sector, the functioning of natural monopolies, etc. in case of a negative tendency to 
create potential or real threats to national interests.  
Historically, the effective way of combating corruption is the effective government 
legislation of the country and the world's collective, multilateral anti-corruption initiatives. In 
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order to improve the institutional environment in Ukraine, it is necessary to take into account 
the Transparency International Ukraine recommendations for 2019: restart the National 
Agency for the Prevention of Corruption with a new personal composition; to implement the 
proper automatic check of electronic declarations and monitoring the standard of living of 
civil servants; to improve the work of the ProZorro electronic public procurement system; 
introduce electronic public reporting of political parties and mechanisms for verifying their 
finances; to reduce the influence of political players on judicial institutions; to strengthen the 
powers of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. New national economic security 
strategy has to contain all recommendation mentioned above. 
At the level of the individual enterprise, the initiatives considered should be combined 
with the Internal Code of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). In order to level the scheme 
"enterprise as a subject of corruption", first of all, it is necessary: to implement the mechanism 
of open verification of information about beneficiary owners of business entities; extend the 
practice of introducing open budgets and set up supervisory boards at state and municipal 
enterprises. To level out the scheme "enterprise as an object of corruption" it is necessary to 
intensify the processes of privatization and corporatization of enterprises; launch an effective 
sale of property of insolvent enterprises through transparent electronic auctions; to stimulate 
the involvement of business in the implementation of the principles of CSR. 
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